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V. KEYNOTE ADDRESS
PROFESSOR RASKIN: Well, we already know at least one judge who
believes in equal protection and the right to vote in the District of
Columbia. He also thinks the plaintiffs are going to win. His name is
Judge John Ferren. Now, I hasten to add that he is not on the bench
now. He is the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, the
people's lawyer. Boy, he has breathed new life into that phrase. He's
made the idea of Constitutional rights come alive for hundreds of
thousands of people.
Judge Ferren, as D.C. Corporation Counsel, presides over an office of
more than 200 lawyers, one of the bigger public interest law firms in
Washington, D.C., where he represents all of the interests of the District
of Columbia.
He has stated that he thinks nothing is more
fundamental than the right to vote and has launched this historic
voting rights litigation, which he will discuss.
It has been a great pleasure for me to get to knowJudge Ferren. He
is the soul of reason and compassion, careful analysis and sobriety of
mind, and seriousness of ethical purpose.
In just the course of the last several months, I have learned a great
deal from Judge Ferren in my collaboration with him and with that
noted radical law firm of Covington and Burling, which is the pro bono
counsel working with the District of Columbia on this case.
Judge Ferren was appointed to the D.C. Court of Appeals by
President Carter and served there for twenty years. Before that, he had
been a partner at Hogan and Hartson in Washington. In the late 1960s,
he was the director of the Legal Services Program and a lecturer at
Harvard Law School. Before going to Harvard, he had been at the law
firm of Kirkland and Ellis.
He has had an extremely distinguished career in the law. So we are
thrilled to welcome to the Washington College of Law John Ferren,
distinguished Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia.
MR. FERREN: Thank you very much, Jamie. I don't know anyone
who has described compassion and reason going together, and I was
delighted that you were willing to say that about me. I hope it is true.
I am very pleased to be here. I think this is a tremendous conference.
This voting rights effort for the District caused me to remember that I
have voted for the House and Senate in Illinois, and in Massachusetts.
I moved here in 1970, and for twenty-eight years, I have just been
anesthetized, not worried about voting. I must admit to you that when
Jamie joined with us and we started to pursue the idea of this lawsuit, I
got very angry. I feel it is outrageous that we don't have the right to
vote in the District.
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I feel there has been an awakening. The adrenaline is flowing. We
are going to get the vote. Of course, I first want to acknowledge the
tremendous contribution thatJamie Raskin has given us by illuminating
what constitutional imperatives we should pay attention to in seeking
full voting representation for the District-on par with the citizens of
the fifty states. Jamie, I think without your scholarship and your
unrelenting advocacy for the District's citizens, this effort to gain full
voting rights would still be languishing. I want to salute you for doing
that.
I also would like to stress our debt of gratitude to the law firm of
Covington and Burling, particularly to Charles Miller, Tom Williamson,
Robert Wick, and Evan Schultz. They have labored countless hours,
pro bono of course, to construct the suit that we filed three weeks ago
in the federal district court for the District of Columbia.
Through their efforts, Jamie's scholarship has been transformed into
what we will call hard-nosed litigation, despite what I heard this
morning. This is exactly what we are going to need to win the case.
The truth is that the lead counsel in this case are the Covington crew. I
want there to be no mistake about that.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the foundational work that
Professor Peter Raven-Hansen of the George Washington Law School
has contributed on this issue over two decades ago.
Now I would like to address the reasons why I think this lawsuit is
critically important. Then, I would like to explain why the lawsuit,
which stakes a claim founded on the voting rights of individual citizens,
is also about the District as a community. In answering this latter
question, I hope also to answer why, as Corporation Counsel, I believed
it was appropriate-indeed essential-for this suit to be brought on
behalf of the District itself, not just on behalf of District citizens as
individuals.
The short answer to all of these questions is simple: voting
replresentation in both houses of Congress can be, in my opinion, the
single most powerful catalyst for positive change in the District that we,
as lawyers, can hope to achieve. Why is this true?
Others have spoken and will continue to speak at this conference
about the compelling constitutional issues this case presents; I don't
really want to talk about those. I want us to think about the day to day
impact that Congress has on the lives of District citizens, and why voting
representation in Congress for the District has the potential to
change-for the better-the way that Congress exercises its
constitutional power under the District Clause to legislate on the
District's behalf. Remember, we are not talking about statehood;
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Congress will still have the final word on our local legislation. Congress
is our local legislature, even if we win this lawsuit.
So to begin with, let's talk about what Congress is and is not in the
District of Columbia. As you know, in 1973 Congress legislated "home
rule" for the District of Columbia,3 7 creating for us a traditional
tripartite system of government composed of an elected mayor, who is
the chief executive, an elected thirteen member council, which is our
legislative branch, and of course, an independent judiciary, which has
both trial and appellate courts. Our local form of government is
democratically constituted and resembles, in most respects, the local
governments of many other jurisdictions, except for one thing: Section
102 of the Home Rule Act, the act of Congress that gave the District a
traditional, elected, democratic government, begins with this huge
caveat: "Subject to the retention by Congress of the ultimate legislative
authority over the Nation's Capital granted by Article I, Section Eight,
of the Constitution. .. ."' In Title VI of the Home Rule Act, Congress
elaborated:
Notwithstanding any other provision of [the Home Rule Act], the
Congress of the United States reserves the right, at any time, to
exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the Distric4 by
enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether within or
without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by this
Act, including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the

District prior to or after enactment of [the Home Rule Act] and any
act passedby the CounciL'

That is to say, pursuant to the Home Rule Act, Congress-a body in
which District citizens have no voting representation whatsoever-can
override any and every action of the democratically elected local
government.
Congress, therefore, is every bit as much a local
legislature as it is a national legislature here, and we don't vote for
either one.
The language I just quoted, declaring the right of Congress to enact
legislation for the District on any subject, comes uncomfortably close to
a quote Jamie used in his forthcoming law review article. He quotes
Thomas Paine, who said in 1776: "Britain... has declared, that she has
a right (not only to tax) but 'to bind us in all cases whatsoever,' and if
being bound in that manner is not slavery, then there is no such thing
as slavery upon the earth.""4 °
137. See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-198,87 Stat. 774 (1973) [hereinafter Home Rule Act].
138. Id. § 102 (codified at D.C. CODEANN. § 1-201 (a) (1998)).
139. Id. § 601 (codified at D.C. CODEANN. § 1-206 (1998)) (emphasis added).
140. See Raskin, supra note 1, at 39 (quoting THOSN, PAINE, THE AMERCmAN CRisis, NUMBER
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Melodramatic words, perhaps, but think about it. To feel the true
magnitude of our circumstances, imagine for a moment that Congress
tomorrow told all of the citizens of the state of Montana-a state similar
in population to the District-that they were being stripped of their
United States Representative and two United States Senators, and that
Congress---in which Montana would now have only a non-voting
delegate-at any time could override any action of the state legislature
and town councils, anywhere in Montana, without affording any special
process whereby the views of Montanans could be heard, save through
the person of their single, non-voting delegate. Would Montanans be
outraged? I think so. Would the rest of the country view this
deprivation of Montanans' rights asjust? I think not.
Yet that is precisely the circumstance we in the District live with every
day, and have lived with for the larger part of 200 years. We suffer from
a kind of proxy representation, or "virtual representation," that the
colonists started a revolution to change. Contrary to Judge Markman's
suggestions, I don't believe that District residents' supposed ability to
"schmooze" with Congresspeople in town-if we could recognize
them-is going to make any difference.
So what are the consequences of this circumstance, and how might
this circumstance change when our voting status changes (without a
revolution), even though congressional power remains over us through
the District Clause?
First, I would offer a quick survey of the ways in which congressional
action has an impact on daily life in the District of Columbia. Some of
my examples are familiar and well publicized. Others may surprise you.
You heard about some of them this morning.
Every law passed by the Council, our local legislature, is subject to
congressional review. Although congressional veto of Council-passed
legislation is rare, it happens. Phaps more importantly, the Councilin every deliberation, in every vote-must be aware that if its action
displeases Congress, Congress can exercise its veto authority, either
directly or through the appropriations process.
The full impact of this congressional "trump" has been demonstrated
with overwhelming force in the transfer-with no participation by our
Council-of much control over District government to the unelected
five-member Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance
Authority, commonly called the "Control Board," and its appointed
Chief Management Officer. These folks, as you know, have been given
tremendous executive authority, and arguably even some legislative
ONE (R. Carlile 1819)).
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authority. And they answer not to the District and to the voters, but to
Congress. Virtually every initiative the District's "home rule," elected
government attempts to undertake is subject to approval or veto by this
congressionally-imposed, unelected "super-government."
But assuming the current control period will end in 2001 or 2002,
even then Congress will exercise enormous power over the District.
Although the Congress rarely exercises its direct legislative veto, it
exercises a de facto veto with some regularity, through the control of
the District's purse strings.1 4' As most of you know, the District
government lacks the authority to appropriate its own funds. Let me
emphasize that this restriction does not only pertain to federal funds,
which are now a negligible part of the District's budget. It also pertains
to purely local funds generated by the District government from District
sources. Congress, not our elected local government, ultimately
decides how much we shall be taxed locally and how much we shall
spend-and not spend-of our own money. The District Charter
contained in the Home Rule Act states clearly:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as making any change in
existing law, regulation, or basic procedure and practice relating to
the respective roles of the Congress, the President, the Federal Office
of Management and Budget, and the Comptroller General of the
United States in the preparation, review, submission, examination,
authorization, and appropriation of the total budget of the District of
Columbia government.
That is to say, if Congress won't appropriate the money (virtually all of
which now comes from the District's own revenue sources), we
taxpayers cannot carry out our objectives.
The effects of this congressional control over our purse strings,
although buried in the depths of appropriations acts and couched in
the inevitable bureaucratic language, are very tangible, as Professor
Butler pointed out this morning. Congress has used its control over
D.C. appropriations, for example, to prevent the District from
effectuating the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act of 1992, which the
Council enacted to provide for registration of domestic partnerships in
the District and to allow D.C. employees and their domestic partners
many of the same benefits available to married couples. 4
I have to tell you that just this morning, a guard sitting outside the
mayor's office asked me about this domestic partnership law because
141. See, eg., District of Columbia Supplemental Appropriations and Recissions Act, H.R. 5517,
102d Cong. (1992) (vetoed by the President, Sept. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Appropriations Act]
(enjoining the use of funds to implement the Health Care Benefit Expansion Act).
142. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 603,87 Stat. 774,814 (1973).
143. SeeAppropriations Act, supra note 141.
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somebody had come to the mayor's office-it is right there in the D.C.
Code-and asked, "How do I sign up for it?" The fact is, in an
appropriations act,4 4Congress said, "No." It is on the books, but you
can't implement it.

Congress, through a rider to our appropriations bill, prohibits the
District from using even local, non-federal funds to provide lawful
abortion services. School voucher plans are perennially proposed as an
amendment to the District appropriations bill, irrespective of our
school authorities' contrary views on the subject.
In 1997 Congress enacted a provision requiring the Council of the
District of Columbia to adopt the recommendations of the
To
congressionally-created "Truth in Sentencing Commission."'5
States
United
the
to
delegated
Congress
its
requirement,
enforce
Attorney General the power to amend the D.C. Code to effectuate the
Commission's recommendations if the Council, for any reason,
declined to enact the recommended changes to our criminal laws in
their entirety. 46
Amendments have been attached to the House version of our fiscal
year 1999 appropriations bill prohibiting even the use of local funds to
carry out the District's needle exchange program, notwithstanding that
local health officials say the program is needed. 1 7 Another amendment
prohibits the use of local funds to carry out adoptions by gay couples,
overruling District policy on the subject.'
This summer, the House approved an amendment to our
appropriations bill criminalizing the possession of tobacco products by
District children, but refused to approve our office's effort to retain
counsel to bring litigation-similar to cases many states have broughtrecoup the Medicaid costs to the
against the tobacco companies to
49
District of tobacco-related disease.
In perhaps its most audacious move, the House version of the fiscal
year 1999 appropriations bill, as you have heard, would prevent my
office from spending even District-generated monies to pursue our

144. See 138 CONG. REc. S10,902 (1992) (prohibiting the use of funds to implement or enforce
the domestic partnership law).
145. 143 CONG. REC. S11,211-22 (1997) (establishing the Guidelines, membership and duty of
the truth in sentencing commission).
146. l at $11,211(a).
147. See The D.C. Appropriations Act, H.R. 4380, 105th Cong. (1998) (approving the Tiahrt
Amendment, prohibiting any funds to be used on a program which distributes needles for illegal
drug use).
148. S&eid. (approving the Largent Amendment which prohibits any funds to be used to carry
out ajoint adoption of a child between individuals who are not related by blood or marriage).
149. See id- (approving the Bilbray Amendment, prohibiting the possession of tabacco products
by minors in the district).
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constitutional voting rights case, or even to advance any further our
petition to Congress for redress of our constitutional grievance.
The issue is not whether one agrees or disagrees with any of these
appropriations amendments as a matter of policy. The issue is, these
are congressionally-imposed edicts forced on the District through the
appropriations process by members of the legislature in which District
citizens have no voting representation.
Of all of the instances I have cited, Congress, which in no way is
legally accountable to the District voters, is overriding laws and policies,
and it is overriding the policies made by our local "home rule"
government, the only governmental body in which our electorate has a
voice.
But would even one vote in the House and two votes in the Senate
change any of that? Would the District be routinely out-voted even on
matters of strictly local importance? I don't think so, and here is why.
Roll Call, the Capitol Hill newspaper, wrote earlier this year:
It is no secret that the city's real bosses... who control the city
fortunes in Congress [are] Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC), chairman of
the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of
Columbia; Sen. Lauch Faircloth (R-NC), chairman of the Senate
Appropriations DC subcommittee; Rep. Thomas Davis (R-VA),
chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight District
subcommittee.'50
How different our fortunes might be if the roster read: "Sen. Eleanor
Holmes Norton (D-DC), chairman of the Senate Appropriations DC
subcommittee; Sen. Carol Schwartz (R-DC), ranking minority member;
and Rep. Anthony Williams (D-DC), chairman of the House
Appropriations subcommittee on the District of Columbia and ranking
member, House Government Reform and Oversight District
subcommittee." (I allocated those seats by lot!)
The prerogatives of committee chairs and even ranking members are
well-established, and their control on the Hill over what hearings are
held and not held, what proposals will move and will not move, and
what gets funded, or will not, are well known.
"Congressional government is committee government,"151 said
Woodrow Wilson in 1884, an observation that still holds true today.
Furthermore, as we all know, members of Congress, particularly
senators, accord one another professional courtesies and reciprocal
deference that greases the wheels of legislation. Surely a voting
150. Duncan Spencer, DC Question of the Year, ROLL CALL, Jan. 26, 1998, available in LFXls,
News Library, US. News Combined File.
151.

WOODROWWIISON, CONGRESSIONALGOVERNMENT79 (15th ed. 1900) (1885).
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delegation from the District of Columbia, eligible over time for the
perks and privileges of leadership, would wield considerably more
influence over the legislative process that directly affects the District
than can ever occur when the most able non-voting delegate is present.
Then, too, there is the issue of "horse trading" we heard about this
morning. Remember Michael v. Anderson, 52 the case in which a group
of Republican members of the House sought to enjoin enforcement of
the House rule, since repealed, that gave our delegate a vote in the
House Committee of the Whole? The plaintiffs contended that our
delegate's vote would dilute their power, and that it, therefore, was
unconstitutional.
The plaintiff members of Congress submitted
affidavits which, in the court's words, "describe[d] the legislative horse
trading process."'53 The court specifically recognized "that such
practices may be a daily fact of life on Capitol Hill."'5 The court agreed
with the plaintiffs' contention that "votes are the 'currency of the
House,"" 5 5-- but it held that the D.C. Delegate's votes in the Committee
of the Whole, which could be nullified if that delegate's vote became
dispositive, amounted to "counterfeit bills," and therefore did not
threaten to dilute the plaintiffs' congressional voting rights. The point
is that both the plaintiffs in that case and the court would surely agree
that full voting rights for the District's representative would provide her
with valuable political "currency" to be expended for the District's
benefit-currency which only a vote that counts can bring.
Recently I talked to a lawyer in town, a friend of mine who about ten
years ago was representing Puerto Rico. He took the governor of
Puerto Rico to visit a senator with whom he had made an appointment.
They arrived at the senator's office, but the senator wasn't there. A
staffer was there. My friend and the governor of Puerto Rico were
announced, and the staffer said, "Come in, and wait a minute." For the
next five minutes, they heard the ending of a marvelous Handel
oratorio. Then the staffer talked to the governor. My friend said, 'You
know, if I had brought the governor of a state, the senator would have
been there, and that staffer wouldn't have listened to that oratorio, just
making us stand there." That story tells a lot. My friend now supports
statehood for Puerto Rico. I think that this anecdote is a powerful
vignette. I think it captures what I am talking about.
Imagine how full voting representation might change the tenor of
renewed debate over the commuter tax-a form of reciprocal income
152.
153.
154.

817 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1993), affd 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
817 F. Supp. at 144.
Id.

155. Id.
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tax that is a powerful revenue generating tool used by jurisdictions
across the country, including Virginia and Maryland, but which the
Home Rule Charter prohibits the District to impose on the legions of
56
suburban workers who come into the District to theirjobs every day.
As it stands, the members of Congress who represent our neighbors
in Maryland and Virginia have little incentive to hear our case for the
commuter tax, and representatives from the rest of the country have
little interest. But what if the senator from Maryland or the
representative from Virginia-or perhaps, more importantly,
disinterested memben; from California, Colorado, or Georgia-needed
our votes? What if they knew that the bill establishing a new Navy base
on their shores, or an environmental project in their mountains, or a
job initiative they were sponsoring wouldn't get through committeeor couldn't pass-without the D.C. members' votes?
Although our delegation to Congress might be small compared to
those of some states, it would be precisely the same size and wield the
same clout as the delegation that represents every other congressional
district. Although every citizen in the land has but one representative
and two senators for whom he or she votes, there is no doubt in my
mind that the citizens who have that vote feel vastly more empowered,
and, in fact, they are vastly more empowered, to influence and
participate in affairs of the nation than those of us who have no vote.
Which brings me to why I think this case is important to the District
as a community, as a local government entity, beyond the very great
importance of the individual constitutional rights described in our
lawsuit. For better or for worse, many aspects of our individual and
community lives are governed by the laws Congress makes and, here in
the District, by the money Congress lets us spend. Having a meaningful
voice in the making of those laws and the appropriation of those
monies-including the impact of horse trading, the respect reflected in
senatorial courtesy, and the prerogatives of the chairs and ranking
members-affects more than the voting rights of qualified electors in
the District.
The outcome of this case has the potential to affect the legal and
social environment of every woman, man, and child, citizen or alien,
rich or poor, whatever the race, Democrat or Republican, who lives in
the District of Columbia-all of whom, I believe, are entitled to the best
that we in the District government can provide.
I pledge everything in my being to make voting rights in Congress
156. See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L
No. 95-198,87 Stat. 774 (1973).

